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Mapping organ exchange: Transnational cooperation in trans-
plantation and organ donation in Europe
Frank Meyer
Abstract
Despite the tendency to harmonise many policy areas in Europe 
transnationally, the respective health systems of the member 
countries have remained predominantly nationally regulated 
and focused. The article illustrates the current state of transna-
tional cooperation for the specific case of organ donation and 
transplantation medicine in Europe, a field in which coopera-
tion was essential and has been established since the end of the 
1960s in many forms. Yet, no homogeneous regime of European 
responsibilities emerged from this experience with coopera-
tion. Instead, we find a patchwork of different ways to regu-
late organ donation and transplantation and to cooperate with 
other countries. Based on extensive empirical research in more 
than 30 European countries, the article elaborates an overview 
and a typology of the prevalent forms of cooperation and dis-
cusses the obstacles for a further harmonisation in this field.
Organ donation, transplantation, transnational, regulation, Eu-
ropean Union, scale, organ exchange
Zusammenfassung
Organtausch: Transnationale Kooperation bei Trans­
plantation und Organspende in Europa
Trotz zunehmender transnationaler Harmonisierung einer 
Viel zahl von Politikbereichen in Europa sind Gesundheitssys-
teme immer noch vorrangig national reguliert und fokussiert. 
Der Artikel illustriert den aktuellen Stand transnationaler 
Kooperation für den spezifischen Fall der Organspende und 
Transplantationsmedizin in Europa: einem Feld, in dem bereits 
seit dem Ende der 1960er Jahre verschiedene Formen der Zu-
sammenarbeit etabliert sind und für dessen Erfolg essentiell 
waren. Dennoch, so das Hauptargument, entstand auf der Ba-
sis jener Kooperationserfahrungen kein einheitliches Regime 
europäi sierter Verantwortlichkeiten, sondern vielmehr eine un-
einheitliche Collage verschiedenster Arten und Weisen, Organ-
spende und Transplantation zu regulieren. Dementsprechend 
erarbeitet der Artikel eine Übersicht und Typologie der aktuell 
etablierten Kooperationsweisen und erörtert auf der Basis ex-
tensiver empirischer Forschung in mehr als 30 europäischen 
Staaten die Hürden, die einer weiteren Harmonisierung in die-
sem Bereich entgegen stehen.
Organspende, Transplantation, transnational, Regulation, Eu-
ropäische Union, scale, Organtausch
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Systematising European coopera­
tion in transplantation
Although organ donation has been es-
tablished as a medical practice in many 
European countries since the middle of 
the 20th century, recent years have shown 
a significant increase in donation num-
bers. For instance, Spain has increased 
its number of actual donors (per million 
population) from around 35 in 2003 to 
43.8 in 2016, and Croatia from 8.9 to al-
most 40 donors pmp (see transplant-
observatory.org 2016). However, there 
have also been cases in which donation 
numbers dropped; for instance Ger-
many’s numbers plummeted from 15.9 
donors pmp in 2007 (see ibid.) to a stag-
gering 9,7 donors per million population 
in 2017 (see dso.de 2018).
The different performances of national 
systems are no surprise given their dif-
ferent organisational structure with re-
gard to the consent systems in place, the 
different funding mechanisms, the differ-
ent extent of political support etc. (see 
e.g. COORENOR 2013). In consequence, 
the national organ donation rates in Eu-
rope differ significantly from country to 
country with values between 0 and 43.8 
donors pmp (see statistics from trans-
plant-observatory.org 2016).
Whilst this fact alone may not raise 
eyebrows, the differences between the 
performance of these systems triggers 
pressure on the poor-performing sys-
tems as low donation figures mean less 
transplantations and thus a higher risk of 
terminally ill patients dying while waiting 
for a donor organ. Furthermore, less do-
nors also mean a lower variety of blood 
types and tissue characteristics in the 
donor organ pool – a crucial issue given 
that a proper match between the donor 
and the recipient can reduce the risk of 
rejection of the transplanted organ after 
surgery and reduce the amount of immu-
nosuppression medication needed.
Some organisational structures have 
been put in place in the second half of 
the 20th century to cope with these is-
sues: Institutions such as Eurotransplant 
and Scandiatransplant are organisations 
based on agreements between member 
states or transplant centres that engage 
in a legal form of organ exchange. Such 
transnational bodies are responsible for 
organ allocation – the medical procedure 
of finding the best matching recipient for 
a donor organ whilst ensuring the lowest 
possible time of the organ being without 
perfusion and furthermore minimising 
the rejection risk.
These forms of legal organ exchange 
differ significantly from internationally 
condemned forms of organ trade and or-
gan trafficking (see WHO 2010a): Whilst 
the latter phenomena relate to recipients 
paying living donors or organ brokers for 
an organ and are considered criminal and 
unethical in most countries of the world, 
legal organ exchange is an officially man-
dated practice amongst many European 
states with established national trans-
plantation systems and usually happens 
in specific cases or in case no proper 
recipient can be found within the donor 
country.
The developments in this field mirror 
more general developments in matters 
of the transnationalisation of social and 
welfare state politics in Europe. Yet, the 
social dimension of European integration 
has not led to complete harmonisation 
but created a heterogeneous picture of 
“bounded varieties of welfare” (Falkner 
2010, p. 305): A parallel existence of dif-
ferent degrees of entanglement and har-
monisation in various sub-fields of social 
policies that has emerged in the course 
of the EU’s “various direct and indirect 
effects of European integration” (ibid.). 
Rather important are the indirect effects 
of a more and more globalised Europe 
where mobility and the free flow of peo-
ple, capital, technology and information 
creates opportunities for cooperation, yet 
also pressures to cooperate to keep up.
Transnational cooperation in trans-
plantation and organ donation, as I will 
argue, mirrors these developments be-
cause it is a prime example for the extent 
to which national health systems have 
become entangled with each other in 
Europe, although they are still subject to 
national responsibility. At the same time, 
it also exemplifies how heterogeneous 
transnational solutions in contemporary 
Europe are, given the acceptance of na-
tional differences even in matters seen to 
be in need of more harmonisation.
This article aims to illuminate the is-
sue of legal transnational exchange of 
human organs in Europe. It will detail 
the procedures of organ donation and 
transplantation in the national context 
and highlight current practices of coop-
erating on a transnational scale. Based on 
empirical work on the extent and the dif-
ferent ways of regulating such exchange 
schemes, I will highlight their principles 
and outline the complex ways of dealing 
with national differences in that matter.
Methdology and aim
The article is the first of a series of ar-
ticles focusing on the spatio-scalar 
regulation of health matters under the 
global condition. It is based on exten-
sive empirical work under the auspices 
of the research project “Cross-border 
assemblages of medical practices” and 
was funded by the German research 
foundation. Between 2016 and 2018, I 
conducted 134 interviews with health 
officials, transplant professionals and 
patients in more than 30 European coun-
tries. These qualitative interviews aimed 
at uncovering the complexities in regu-
lating and conducting organ donation 
and transplantation (for the transplant 
professionals and health officials) whilst 
also taking into account the subjective ex-
periences of patients and their relatives. 
For this article’s endeavour, an approach 
was chosen that focused on supplement-
ing the available information on the or-
ganisation of organ donation and trans-
plantation by the contextual information 
provided with transplant professionals 
and health officials. This approach aimed 
at composing a comprehensive image of 
similarities and differences between the 
different national systems with regard to 
their regulation and clinical practices. 
Transplantation and organ alloca­
tion: a primer
Organ transplantation involves the trans-
fer of a human organ from a deceased 
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(e.g. heart, lung, liver, kidney) or living 
(e.g. liver, kidney) donor to a severely ill 
recipient. Donation rates themselves are 
influenced by a multitude of factors oscil-
lating around the individual’s disposition 
towards donation, the medical proce-
dures in the hospitals and the regulatory 
environment in each country (see Meyer 
forthcoming). 
From a procedural point of view and 
using the example of Germany, an act of 
organ donation is the outcome of a se-
ries of medical procedures following the 
diagnosis of a patient’s death according 
to nationally legitimate protocols and 
criteria (e.g. irreversible brain (stem) 
death, death after circulatory arrest; see 
Delmonico 2010). If specific criteria have 
been met, the potential deceased donor 
is reported to an organ procurement or-
ganisation that organises the subsequent 
process according to specific legal and 
ethical standards (e.g. the DSO [Deutsche 
Stiftung Organspende] in Germany). In a 
next step, it is to be determined whether 
the prospective donor has documented 
his/her consent to organ donation. In 
some countries and, thus, legal frame-
works, deceased patients may per se be 
considered to have consented if they have 
not officially registered their dissent. Yet, 
clinicians usually ask the family for fur-
ther information on the medical history of 
the deceased person as well as their con-
sent or authorisation to organ donation. 
After having obtained consent, medical 
examinations determine the suitability of 
the potential donor with regard to possi-
ble diseases that would contraindicate an 
organ transmission to another person. In 
a next step, the donor and his/her medi-
cal characteristics are reported to an or-
gan allocation organisation which then 
matches the donor’s organs with the ill 
patients’ tissue and/or blood character-
istics on organ-specific waiting lists. After 
the organ recovery, transport and trans-
plantation into the respective recipients, 
the recipients have to maintain a lifelong 
medication of immunosuppression to 
prevent organ rejection.
The procedure of allocating a donor or-
gan to a suitable recipient differs slightly 
from country to country and from organ 
to organ, and is usually intersected by 
considerations of the organ-specific is-
chemic time (meaning the time outside 
the body without perfusion), its qual-
ity given the donor’s medical history, the 
organ-specific immunological reactive-
ness and the availability of substitute 
measures (such as dialysis for kidneys). 
Every measure taken in this regard aims 
at reducing the risk of post-transplant re-
jection (see e.g. Kumbala, Zhang 2013).
Considering the issue of ischemic time, 
medical studies report no significant ir-
reversible downsides of kidneys with up 
to 24 h of cold ischemic time (meaning 
ischemia in the state of being cooled; see 
Teraski 2011). In contrast, the maximum 
tolerated ischemic time for hearts is usu-
ally considered to be around 4 hours with 
higher time periods being debated (see 
e.g. Mitropoulos et al. 2005). However, 
donor-specific diseases may compromise 
the organ’s quality and ability to perform 
its function after this period of stress. Fur-
thermore, the donor’s age influences the 
organ’s tolerance to longer ischemic times 
(see Russo et al. 2007). 
Another important influence for the al-
location process revolves around the im-
munological reactiveness of an organ that, 
for instance, necessitates – in addition to 
blood group matching – an antigen-analy-
sis in leucocytes that are known to be rel-
evant for immunological responses (e.g. 
in the case of kidneys; see e.g. Sheldon, 
Poulton 2006). Livers, in contrast, tol-
erate certain antibody-incompatibilities, 
and are – in addition to correct blood-
group-specific matching – matched with 
regard to donor-recipient similarities e.g. 
in size (see more specifically Reddy et al. 
2013). This aspect further overlaps with 
the consideration of substitute therapies: 
Given that dialysis is a viable option for 
many kidney-transplant prospects and 
that the ischemic tolerance of the organ 
is relatively high, a precise matching 
is aimed for to reduce post-transplant 
complications. In contrast, a similarly 
established substitute therapy does not 
exist for liver diseases; in connection 
with the lower ischemic tolerance and 
lower immunological reactiveness, less 
time-consuming methods are pursued 
for matching.
The medical matching process aside, 
the allocation of an organ– depending on 
the respective country – furthermore in-
corporates e.g. considerations of distance, 
of fairness of distribution, of taking into 
account certain medical circumstances 
that need immediate or preferred treat-
ment due to lower probabilities of donor 
organs (e.g. in high urgent cases, patients 
with high number of antibodies, paedia-
tric patients, necessity for a multi-organ 
transplant). In some countries (and in 
case of some organs), some or all donor 
organs are utilised for patients in the 
transplant centre responsible for the do-
nation whereas other countries do not 
have this kind of regional logic and em-
ploy a centralised (national) waiting list 
(e.g. the UK, Germany). This, of course, is 
influenced by the number of transplant 
centres in the respective countries, rang-
ing between 1 (e.g. in Hungary, Finland, 
Norway) and more than 40 (in Germany).
In general, most allocation systems 
employ a database in which all donor 
and recipient characteristics are to be 
specified. After this, an organ and tissue-
compatibility-specific priority list is gen-
erated that incorporates the potential 
recipients that have the highest tissue 
matching results (e.g. in Eurotransplant) 
and have acquired certain organ-specific 
scores due to the severity of their situa-
tion and/or their waiting time. This list 
ultimately determines the sequence of 
whom to offer the organ. In other coun-
tries, the respective surgeons may have 
more freedoms in deciding to whom the 
organ should be transplanted with regard 
to medical and patient-centred consid-
erations (e.g. in Scandiatransplant). After 
having determined whether the potential 
recipient is actually fit for transplant and 
doing last-minute screenings of the donor, 
the donor organ and the potential recipi-
ent, the transplant will then go ahead. In 
that regard, many countries in Europe 
with a transplantation program utilise a 
complex system of algorithms, often com-
puter-assisted, to perform these tasks and 
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determine the best recipient for a donor 
organ to minimise risk of post-transplant 
rejection. Thus, they are usually obliged 
to ensure that the allocation is performed 
according to medical rationales and le-
gal requirements (e.g. according to the 
respective transplant act, acts on data 
protection, etc.) and have to document all 
decisions to provide quality control and 
liability.
Cooperation in organ allocation in 
Europe
Modern health systems are usually con-
fined to their country of origin: They 
are set up to work within its geographic 
boundaries whereas additional services 
may be offered for travellers to different 
countries (e.g. in the case of the European 
Union). Whilst some responsibilities and 
efforts in social welfare have been under 
direct or indirect influence of the Europe-
an Union, health systems still remain a na-
tional priority (see e.g. Schmucker 2009). 
Transnational entanglement in matters of 
health care in Europe resulted more from 
indirect consequences of court rulings on 
the basic freedoms in the European Union 
(see Schwarzenberg forthcoming). This is 
a phenomenon that Falkner highlights to 
be of specific importance for social pol-
icy, stating that such direct and indirect 
effects of European integration have cre-
ated a heterogeneity of entanglements 
in social policies in the European Union 
(Falkner 2009, p. 305). For matters of 
health policy, Newdick criticises that this 
complexity equals a fundamental govern-
mental change because “by expanding the 
free movement principle to absorb public 
health care services, the power to regulate 
is shifted toward European institutions 
and national authority is undermined” 
(Newdick 2009, p. 867).
However, in the field of transplantation, 
transnational cooperation has not been 
introduced top down but has emerged on 
the ground at the initiative of clinicians: 
Since the introduction of transnational 
organisations such as Eurotransplant 
in 1967 and Scandiatransplant in 1969, 
cooperation regarding the allocation of 
a deceased donor’s organ to a potential 
recipient based on tissue and blood char-
acteristics has become frequent. As a mat-
ter of fact, 18 European countries with 
well-developed transplant programmes 
do engage in common allocation schemes 
(Eurotransplant, Scandiatransplant, NHS 
BT; see Fig. 1). 
17 countries are member of transna-
tional organ exchange schemes without 
common allocation, and most of the other 
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European countries with a noteworthy 
transplant programme have at least bi-
lateral agreements on organ exchange 
and support activities to boost their own 
transplant programme (see Fig. 2). Trans-
national institutional regulation, in this 
field, has remained rather scarce.
There are at least two core reasons 
based on which countries come together 
to conceive transnational bodies with 
such existential responsibilities (see also 
Weiss et al. 2015). First, this move mir-
rors the rationale behind economies of 
scale, because the more variance in do-
nors and recipients can be pooled in gen-
eral, the higher is the possibility to find a 
suitable organ for a patient in need of it 
in time to save his/her life (see Schnei-
der et al. 2011, p. 1372). Tissue charac-
teristics (e.g. antigens, blood type), donor/
recipient similarities (e.g. age, size), the 
recipient’s waiting time, special medical 
requirements (e.g. urgency, immunologi-
cal sensitisation in the recipient due to 
past pregnancies or transplants) as well 
as distance between the place of donation 
and of transplantation are taken into ac-
count. Thus, the higher the donor popula-
tion and the recipient population, the more 
combinations between them are possible, 
and the higher is the likelihood of finding 
an optimal match. This is specifically im-
portant for children and for patients with 
rare blood groups and “particular ana-
tomical characteristics” (see Schneider 
et al. 2011, p. 1372). Second, cooperation 
in terms of allocation serves the notion of 
equal treatment and reduces the impor-
tance of geography in transplantation: In 
contrast to Ghaoui et al. (2015) and their 
diagnosis of geographic disparities for the 
US-based UNOS-system, large allocation 
schemes with centralised lists are seen to 
minimise the downsides for recipients liv-
ing in low donation countries or regions 
(see also Fig. 1). Thus, such schemes create 
a notion of fairness and equal distribution 
of medical opportunities.
However, whether an organ crosses the 
border or not is different for every alloca-
tion organisation and is usually laid out 
in its fundamental allocation manual (e.g. 
Eurotransplant 2016). Yet in general, 
high urgent cases, rare tissue characteris-
tics, paediatric patients, highly-sensitised 
patients (with a high number of antibod-
ies), etc. are currently widely considered 
legitimate cases of leaving the national 
realm. In contrast, most organs do not 
leave their country of procurement giv-
en that a national priority has remained 
a prevalent principle – disregarding a 
possible membership in transnational 
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organisations. And even when transna-
tional organ exchange happens, payback 
or balance systems have usually been put 
into place: This means that for every or-
gan that has been given to a country or for-
eign transplant centre, an organ of similar 
quality (e.g. donor age, etc.) has to be given 
back to the country (in Eurotransplant) or 
donating centre (in Scandiatransplant) 
within a certain time frame (see e.g. Eu-
rotransplant 2017, p. 14).
This kind of transnational exchange 
mechanism is a further extension of sub-
national organ exchange, e.g. between 
regions (often tied to hospitals) or trans-
plantation centres. As such, the presence 
of several levels of exchange indicates the 
systems’ need to enlarge their pools of do-
nors and recipients as the fundament for 
an efficient allocation system. How exact-
ly these forms of exchange relate to each 
other proves to be quite heterogeneous 
in comparison, as the way in which differ-
ent actors such as governments, medical 
councils, local, regional and national ac-
tors on the clinical and political side work 
together differs considerably between 
countries (see e.g. COORENOR 2013, p. 2). 
This is related to e.g. a possible primacy of 
certain urban centres that happen to hold 
key hospitals and may serve as the only 
transplant centre, has – however – been 
tackled elsewhere (ibid.).
Data on and types of allocation coope­
ration schemes
Of course, statistics are compiled to calcu-
late allocation relations, which is especial-
ly relevant in those cooperation schemes 
maintaining payback systems as it proves 
to be crucial in order to uphold the balance 
between importing and exporting entities 
and identify imbalances (see also Kirste 
2006, p. 54) and thus local, regional or na-
tional deficits in mobilising donors. How-
ever, precise figures on international organ 
exchange – even if it is happening within 
completely legal frameworks and on the 
grounds of sensible medical reason – are 
usually not published at all, or only in 
highly aggregated manner. For instance, 
in the course of preparing this scien-
tific manuscript, several organ allocation 
organisations have politely declined access 
to data. But if these organisations – simul-
taneously – stress their high transparency 
in order to counter disbeliefs, reservations 
and suspicions about organ donation (and 
what is more frequently problematized in 
public: organ trade), why do they restrict 
access to this kind of data?
Often, access to the data is limited to staff 
from the respective hospitals that is sup-
posed to possess the necessary knowledge 
to interpret it properly, given the differ-
ent regulations applying to different or-
gans, the chronological delay with which 
payback-imbalances are levelled and with 
respect to the medical statuses of donors 
and recipients which resist perfectly lev-
elled balances between organ procurement 
organisations. While I received many rejec-
tions to access this data, one reply particu-
larly highlighted the risk of providing, as it 
was termed, an incomplete picture and the 
risk of leading to wrong conclusions.
I immediately recalled incidents from 
my fieldwork in which organ donation 
professionals in hospitals detailed the re-
luctance they sometimes face by potential 
donors and their families with regard to 
their wish to specify or exclude a specific 
group of recipients from the organ alloca-
tion (see e.g. for a review on this matter for 
the UK: Cronin 2010): I heard these sto-
ries from Switzerland, where professionals 
from one transplant centre at one point in 
time, had strong reservations about send-
ing “their” organs to one specific other 
centre that was seen to underperform in 
donor detection (a state of affairs that has 
since been enhanced). In Northern Ireland, 
I heard stories of Catholic Northern Irish 
citizens asking for the exclusion of English 
recipients (as usually all UK-devolved ad-
ministrations have one common waiting 
list). Also, online commentary sections on 
news about organ donation usually pro-
vide an interesting variety of specimen of 
rants about “immigrants” invading in or-
der to get “our” organs (a matter that in 
principle violates Eurotransplant-guide-
lines) (see e.g. 20min.ch 2017).
These issues have been subject of ex-
tensive scientific coverage within the de-
bate on attitudes towards or reservations 
about organ donation (e.g. for Germany 
see Caille-Brillet et al. 2017). Millman 
(2013) for instance highlights the rel-
evance of myths and superstition during 
the decision-making process for the case 
of Northern Ireland. Using a meta-analy-
sis of the available literature, Irving et al. 
(2012) have more generally abstracted 
eight key factors that influence the deci-
sion on organ donation: relational ties to 
the recipient, religious beliefs, cultural be-
liefs, family influence, body integrity, past 
experiences with the health care system, 
general level of knowledge and personal 
reservations despite positive attitudes. As 
a consequence, the notion that donation 
willingness is an issue to be developed 
rather than a pre-given stable character-
istic among a population has been estab-
lished (see Avsec et al. 2016). However, 
the literature that specifically focuses on 
attitudes towards transnational coopera-
tion remains scarce so far. Quite often, this 
issue is tainted with matters of organ trade 
based on the high complexity of the legal 
system and the prevalence of negative 
coverage about domestic transplantation 
systems (see e.g. Haarhoff 2014 for Ger-
many; see also Nashan et al. 2017).
While organ exchange today is often dis-
cursively entangled with illicit organ trade, 
the medical exchange of organs was one of 
the key ideas behind organisations such as 
the 1967-founded Eurotransplant founda-
tion that sought to optimise the allocation 
process to maximise the outcome for the 
organ recipients. This has been possible 
due to medical progress in the 1960s that 
led to increased ischemic times, increased 
ability to analyse tissue characteristics, to 
lower rejection risks and the necessary 
information-technological inventions.
 Yet, a larger variety of opportunities has 
also triggered aspirations to achieve the 
best match with regard to the maximum 
distance for travel; thus, the largest total-
ity of possible recipients could be tested 
against the limited pool of donors. While 
following this logic, it would seem reason-
able to bundle the donor pools of several 
countries from a medical perspective, this 
would clash with the national contain-
ers that have so far aspired to hold the 
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exclusive right to care for the respective 
country’s population. Yet, so far only one 
transnational exchange organisation has 
fully abandoned national borders in this 
regard and introduced common waiting 
lists: the NHS Blood and Transplant that, 
however, has built this system on the very 
special case of statehood of the United 
Kingdom and its devolved administrations.
Transplant professionals do indeed see 
a risk in fully disclosing the exchange re-
lations and anticipate public backlash al-
though organ exchange is non-commercial 
and fully backed by the legislation on or-
gan transplantation. As the replies to data 
inquiries reveal, professionals in this field 
seem to fear that disclosing the extent to 
which organ exchange happens and the 
balance that is achieved may lead to lessen-
ing support or plummeting donation num-
bers. In the following, I will use the data 
gathered either through public sources or 
by bilateral contacts with the respective 
organisations (e.g. Eurotransplant, Scandi-
atransplant, NHS BT) to abstract four types 
of cooperation in terms of transnational al-
location between nation states.
Allocation cooperation Type A: Bilate­
ral exchange
Many European countries still have a pre-
dominantly nationally organised organ 
procurement and organ allocation system 
in place and manage separate national 
waiting lists. Such systems are character-
ised by the primacy of national responsi-
bility to allocate organs within national 
borders and conduct only limited exchange 
cooperation with other countries (see fig. 
3). Yet, most of these countries do employ 
at least some kind of cooperation that oc-
curs either with some foreign hospitals 
that have development programmes in 
place to assist the establishment of trans-
plant programmes for educational reasons 
(see also Fig. 2). Or – more commonly – 
there is an occasional exchange of surplus 
organs with those countries with which 
specific bilateral exchange agreements 
have been established beforehand, often 
based on trust and a common framework 
for guaranteeing medical quality stand-
ards. This type of allocation cooperation 
is based on an understanding of reciproc-
ity to avoid exchange imbalances; in such 
cases, specific time spans are defined 
within which the exchanged organs have 
to be “paid back” by providing a suitable 
donated organ from the country that has 
formerly received one. Examples of type 
A of allocation cooperation, for instance, 
are Balttransplant (Latvia, Lithuania, for-
merly also Estonia) and the South Alli-
ance for Transplant (France, Italy, Spain, 
Switzerland, Portugal). Also, bilateral 
agreements exist between certain coun-
tries and the hospital in Vienna for cases 
of lung transplantation, in the course of 
which transplant programmes are to be 
developed.
Allocation cooperation Type B: Multi­
lateral exchange
Some countries – in practice – engage 
in multiple complementary exchange 
schemes at once. For instance, allocation 
cooperation schemes of type A sometimes 
overlap with type B – the institutionalised 
multilateral exchange. Whereas, in these 
cases, there are still separate national 
procurement and allocation systems and 
waiting lists, some countries have opted to 
take part in transnational exchange frame-
works (see Fig. 3). Payback-mechanisms 
may or may not be employed in this kind 
of framework. For instance, FOEDUS EOEO 
has been introduced in the course of the 
EU’s FOEDUS Joint Action programme to 
support the establishment of an intra-EU 
common exchange scheme. While a cen-
tralised system for the whole European 
Union was opposed e.g. on grounds of in-
ability to tackle the corresponding long 
ischemic times (see also Schneider et 
al. 2011, p. 1372), the EOEO-mechanism 
continues to be used by some European 
countries. Yet the data for FOEDUS EOEO 
shows that organ exchange still happens 
rather occasionally: Between June 2015 
and March 2017, a total of ten countries 
(Bulgaria, Czech Republic, France, Greece, 
Italy, Lithuania, Slovakia, Spain, Poland, 
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and Switzerland) have exchanged a total 
of 53 organs (Carella et al. 2017). Either, 
member countries offer surplus organs 
that otherwise could not be allocated to 
a suitable recipient in their country of 
origin. In other cases, countries in urgent 
need of organs with certain specific tissue 
criteria issue calls for organs through such 
a framework.
Allocation cooperation Type C: Parti­
ally integrated multilateral allocation
Allocation cooperatives of type B are 
characterised by a relatively high national 
independency to engage in transnational 
exchange frameworks. In contrast, trans-
national multilateral allocation organisa-
tions such as Eurotransplant (Germany, 
Belgium, Bulgaria, Luxemburg, Nether-
lands, Austria, Slovenia, and Croatia) or 
Scandiatransplant (Norway, Sweden, 
Finland, Denmark, Estonia, and Iceland) 
form a third type of organisation (see 
Fig. 4). Here, participating countries (in 
case of Eurotransplant) or hospitals (in 
case of Scandiatransplant) commit to a 
common allocation scheme with a cen-
tralised waiting list. While the responsi-
bility to allocate an organ is transferred 
to the common organisation, there may 
or may not be mechanisms for national 
prioritisation in place: In the case of Eu-
rotransplant, for instance, organs are only 
exchanged in case of high urgent or highly 
sensitised patients, paediatric patients or 
in specific medical programme schemes. 
However, the majority of organs is usually 
transplanted within the respective coun-
try of procurement with payback systems 
in place to guarantee a certain balance be-
tween the respective member countries.
Allocation cooperation Type D: Fully 
integrated multilateral allocation
The fully integrated multilateral coopera-
tion scheme, similar to type C organisa-
tions, employs a common waiting list and 
is responsible for the organ allocation. 
Yet, the respective national procurement 
systems do possess a certain autonomy in 
designing their donation systems (allow-
ing, for instance, for differences in con-
sent systems, etc.). However, imbalances 
between the member countries are gener-
ally tolerated (see Fig. 4; this may differ 
from organ to organ). The best example 
for this kind of cooperation also illus-
trates how special and unique this kind of 
cooperation is: The UK’s “National Health 
Service – Blood and Transplant” (NHS BT) 
serves as the head institution that super-
vises the several transplant programmes 
across all of the UK and their devolved 
administrations (such as England, Wales, 
Scotland, and Northern Ireland). This is 
especially interesting as Wales’ and Scot-
land’s transplant systems differ slightly 
from the other administrations’ systems, 
thus exemplifying the unique institution-
al and legislative circumstances under 
which such a system – transgressing na-
tional boundaries – may exist.
These abstracted types of transnational 
allocation cooperation usually do not ap-
pear separately from one another: For in-
stance, the UK is one of the financers of 
the FOEDUS EOEO-scheme, yet according 
to Carella et al. (2017), has not used the 
system between 2015 and 2017. However, 
there is a bilateral cooperation between 
the NHS BT and the Republic of Ireland. 
Other countries, such as Bulgaria, take 
part in the FOEDUS EOEO-scheme and 
have had bilateral agreements with Eu-
rotransplant (specifically with the Vienna 
hospital in matters of lung transplanta-
tion). Often there are formal bilateral 
agreements in place (e.g. between Malta 
and Italy), despite one of the countries tak-
ing part in type A and/or type-B schemes. 
As a matter of fact, transnational coop-
eration is a field in becoming as increased 
IT-capacities, new medical possibilities in 
the perfusion of deceased-donor-organs 
and more and more homogenised legisla-
tions (e.g. due to the EU’s efforts; see EU 
2010) provide the grounds to consider 
more cooperation in the face of what is 
perceived to be an imbalance between 
patients in need of a substitute organ and 
a lacking supply for that (see e.g. Miggel-
brink et al., p. 18f.)
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The complexity of transnational 
cooperation in organ allocation
In matters of transplantation and organ 
donation, a complex web of subnational, 
national and supranational competencies 
and responsibilities exists. For instance: 
Although the European Union has issued 
several directives on the matter of trans-
plantation (e.g. EU 2010), article 168 of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the Eu-
ropean Union (2009) set up the legal ba-
sis for “measures setting high standards 
of quality and safety of organs and sub-
stances of human origin, blood and blood 
derivatives”. This means that differences 
regarding consent systems, waiting list 
management, allocation and death diag-
nostics are not covered and, thus, remain 
under national legislation. However, an 
international consensus has been estab-
lished banning organ donation without 
the donor’s consent (WHO 2010b). Fur-
thermore, the Council of Europe holds 
competencies in matters of regulating 
the quality and safety of transplanted or-
gans and clinical practices and regularly 
issues guides (e.g. EDQM 2016). As a con-
sequence, the EU concentrated on set-
ting common standards and making the 
respective systems compatible (see EU 
2008, EU 2013, EU 2017). Furthermore, 
research projects such as ACCORD and 
FOEDUS aimed at increasing collabora-
tion in transplantation among EU mem-
ber states.
Yet, there seems to be a limiting ex-
tent to which international cooperation 
is desired: Even the type-D organisation 
scheme – the fully integrated allocation 
system of UK’s NHS BT – allows for differ-
ences in the respective legislation of the 
devolved administrations of e.g. Scotland 
or Wales: For instance and in contrast 
to England or Scotland, a presumed or 
deemed consent system for organ dona-
tion in Wales came into effect in 2015 (see 
National Assembly for Wales 2013). 
This differed from the UK’s common Hu-
man Tissue Act from 2004, and also from 
Scotland’s own Human Tissue (Scotland) 
Act from 2006. Again, whereas transplan-
tation and allocation are transnationally 
organised and regulated, organ donation 
shows significantly different approaches 
even within common exchange schemes. 
However, allocation itself remains rather 
untouched by these differences.
For type-A and type-B exchange 
schemes, such differences do not mat-
ter much as the common basis for the 
exchange has usually been set up by EU-
guidelines and organ and tissue safety. 
Sometimes, further standards for tissue 
typing and a certification programme 
of reference laboratories are agreed on. 
However, as international allocation is not 
conducted, common quality standards al-
ready facilitate optional organ exchange.
In contrast, partially integrated type-
C organisations such as Eurotransplant 
and Scandiatransplant, one the one hand, 
need to incorporate the various national 
legislations and medical capabilities into 
one common scheme, while – on the other 
hand – setting up minimum standards in 
other fields. For instance, setting up certi-
fied laboratories is mandatory for mem-
ber states to allow for a legitimate alloca-
tion that is compatible with all member 
states. Yet, they may employ very differ-
ent organ donation schemes with regard 
to the consent system, the financial sup-
port for donation-specialised personnel 
in hospitals, etc. This may lead to some 
strain on the system as donation rates 
amongst Eurotransplant member states 
range from 5.2 donors pmp (Luxemburg) 
to 39.5 donors pmp (Croatia), and the em-
ployed payback systems for cross-border 
organ exchange (e.g. in high urgent cases) 
have to uphold the balance whilst – with 
higher disparities – not being able to fully 
achieve this.
Another difference concerns the prin-
ciples for death diagnostics that may also 
differ from country to country: In general, 
most countries employ the brain (stem) 
death diagnosis, setting up different di-
agnostic regimes to determine whether 
a patient has suffered fatal irreversible 
brain damage so that – given that such pa-
tients are usually treated in an Intensive 
Care Unit (ICU) and are ventilated – a so 
called dbd(donor after brain death)-do-
nation may be planned. However, some 
countries further conduct dcd-(donor 
after circulatory death)-donation: Here, 
organ donation may take place under 
uncontrolled (e.g. in emergency-depart-
ments) or controlled (in ICUs) circum-
stances after assisting machines have 
been switched off and consent has been 
determined. However, the latter raises 
different ethical questions and is consid-
ered more resource-intensive. As a conse-
quence, Eurotransplant does not allocate 
dcd-organs to countries where dcd-dona-
tion is not conducted for whatever reason 
(see Eurotransplant 2017, p. 7).
Further aspects which the algorithms 
of allocation in type-C organisations need 
to include are for example national or re-
gional priorities according to which the 
organ (or one of the two kidneys) may be 
reserved for recipients in the catchment 
area of the explantation-hospital, etc. This 
relates to the hospital structure in the 
respective member states: Countries in 
which only one hospital with a transplan-
tation programme exists apply different 
national guidelines than countries with 
several hospitals. Other differences, e.g. in 
the case of Eurotransplant, may include: 
• various forms of cooperation bet-
ween hospitals in specific regions 
within/between member states and 
country-specific guidelines on whom 
to enrol in waiting lists, 
• accounting and reimbursement princi-
ples for the hospitals, 
• regulations on when a patient can be a 
recipient (e.g. based on different requi-
red time span of residency),
• procedures of notifying the respective 
national institutions in cases of mis-
conduct or criminal behaviour,
• the extent to which penalties can be 
imposed,
• bonus points for kidney patients who 
have donated one of their own kidneys 
in the past.
Such differences result from different 
national health systems, different proce-
dures in criminal law or different opinions 
in the respective national medical coun-
cils who decide on clinical practices (see 
Meyer forthcoming). Yet, the more inter-
national cooperation in transplantation 
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medicine becomes common, the more 
likely may be claims for further harmoni-
sation to level these differences.
Organ donation and transplanta­
tion: A case of hesitant upscaling
While this article has not set out to make 
an argument for or against further trans-
national cooperation or harmonisation in 
terms of regulation, it nevertheless aimed 
to provide an overview of current ways 
to facilitate legal organ exchange. Fur-
thermore, the article aimed to highlight 
the obstacles for such endeavours.
In conclusion, transplantation and 
organ donation have been subject to re-
markable processes. In the pioneer years 
of transplantation medicine in the early 
1960s, cooperation happened rather be-
tween clinicians and did not involve the 
exchange of organs:
“Donors were sought only in the 
hospitals pioneering transplanta-
tion, and none were initially ob-
tained elsewhere, not only because 
of the need for speedy grafting but 
also because other hospitals were 
uninterested in participating in 
such efforts. Exchange of kidneys 
with the other scattered and dis-
tant transplant units was not con-
sidered” (Hamilton 2012, p. 283).
Yet with medical progress, technological 
advancements and increasing success of 
transplant procedures, national organ 
exchange between hospitals and later on 
between countries within organisations 
such as Eurotransplant became possible 
and legally domesticated. However, a he-
terogeneous collage of organisations and 
ways to facilitate cooperation can still be 
found. At the same time, donation rates 
differ remarkably as well.
This unfortunately coincides with high-
er capabilities for individual mobility and 
growing socio-economic disparities on a 
global scale, thus making the field of organ 
donation and transplantation medicine a 
focal point of homogenising the respec-
tive regulatory frameworks. However, 
this is a political field in becoming and 
nation states and their heterogeneous 
ways of cooperating in terms of organ al-
location have remained the primary scale 
on which transplantation and organ do-
nation is regulated. The extent to which 
a transnationalisation is tolerated and 
national responsibilities are transferred 
to common organisations, from the cur-
rent point of view, will most probably not 
change considerably on the short-run 
(not even in the EU).
On the one hand, such findings reify 
the notion that the nation state resists 
attempts of upscaling and remains the 
bearer of social welfare policies. On the 
other hand, this is a field in which four key 
developments converge:
1. The EU is proactively shaping certain 
aspects of transplantation (e.g. quality 
standards for tissue and organs) and 
thus leads to a harmonisation of insti-
tutions and practices. Other actors (e.g. 
WHO, Council of Europe) have gained 
importance, for instance by being vo-
cal about ethical or quality standards.
2. Furthermore, medicine is a field in 
which mobility and the proliferation 
of knowledge have long been common. 
The inception of cooperation schemes 
by hospitals and clinicians can be con-
sidered a logical continuation. Interna-
tional educational programmes e.g. for 
transplant coordinators (e.g. the Spa-
nish TPM-programme) further put em-
phasis on the proliferation of best prac-
tices that, de facto, leads to a further 
harmonisation of practices in this field.
3. Medical and technological progress 
has advanced the possibilities in trans-
plantation (e.g. in machine-perfusion 
of donated organs, increased ischemia 
times). Other innovations include the 
ability to process large amounts of 
patients’ data to match for the best 
results in the face of a possible organ 
rejection. This creates possibilities for 
cooperation by bundling donor- and 
recipient pools, yet also creates pres-
sure to keep up with the latest de-
velopments.
4. This pressure is fuelled by the fact 
that a so-called organ shortage is no-
wadays widely proclaimed, meaning an 
asymmetry between a relatively small 
number of available donor organs and 
a relatively large number of terminally 
ill patients requiring a substitute org-
an. Keeping up with these needs also 
means preventing widespread organ 
trafficking in the face of prevalent glo-
bal wealth disparities.
Thus, organ donation and transplantation 
medicine serve as examples of hesitant 
upscaling: On the one hand, the harmoni-
sation of regulations and the implementa-
tion of proliferated best practices seems 
to be a logical conclusion given the widely 
available information of performance, 
success rates and the wealth-disparity-
related incentives for transplant tourism. 
Yet, welfare systems have thus far resisted 
moving more responsibilities towards the 
European level. And as of now, there is no 
European initiative in sight that may alter 
the landscape of transplantation coopera-
tion in Europe considerably.
Undoubtedly, transplantation and or-
gan donation will remain a contested 
field where medical and technological 
capabilities, legal requirements, ethical 
considerations and existential individual 
needs clash. The question whether to 
shift the power of regulation away from 
singular states towards larger legislation 
bodies will most probably remain a topic 
for a long time, given that the surround-
ing circumstances (e.g. wealth dispari-
ties, increasing life span and widespread 
lifestyle diseases such as diabetes) are 
unlikely to change dramatically for some 
time. Cooperation in terms of transplanta-
tion in Europe is therefore to be consid-
ered a field in becoming; it has emerged 
on the grounds of conflicting medical 
needs, medical capabilities and sedi-
mented notions of national primacy in 
health care. It flourishes on the grounds of 
medical progress, success and promises 
of patient equality. Yet, it is also closely 
entwined with how transational bodies 
in Europe are able to persist and, maybe, 
will be able to broaden their scope to the 
field of health care as well.
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Обмен органами: транснациональное сотрудни­
чество в области трансплантации и донорства 
органов в Европе
Несмотря на растущую транснациональную гармонизацию 
широкого спектра политических сфер в Европе, системы 
здравоохранения по-прежнему в первую очередь регу-
лируются и приоритизируются на национальном уров-
не. Данная статья описывает текущее состояние транс-
национального сотрудничества для конкретного случая 
до норства органов и трансплантационной медицины в 
Европе, области, в которой еще с конца 1960-х годов созда-
вались различные формы взаимодействия, необходимые 
для его успеха. Однако, согласно основному аргументу, на 
опыте данного сотрудничества не было создано единого 
режима европеизированных обязанностей, а скорее воз-
ник неравномерный коллаж из разных способов регули-
рования донорства и трансплантации органов. Соответст-
венно, данная статья разрабатывает обзор и типологию 
су ществующих в настоящее время форм сотрудничества, 
а также обсуждает препятствия для дальнейшей гармони-
зации в этой области на основе обширных эмпирических 
исследований более чем в 30 европейских странах.
Донорство органов; трансплантация; транснациональ-
ный; регулирование; Европейский союз; масштаб; обмен 
органами
Résumé
Échange d’organes: la coopération transnationale 
pour les transplantations et les dons d’organes en 
Europe
Malgré la poursuite de l’harmonisation transnationale de nom-
breux domaines politiques en Europe, les systèmes de santé 
sont, aujourd’hui encore, principalement à vocation nationale 
et réglementés à l’échelle nationale. L’article illustre la situation 
actuelle de la coopération transnationale pour le cas particulier 
du don d’organes et de la transplantation en Europe, un do-
maine dans lequel il existe différentes formes de collaboration 
depuis la fin des années 1960, ces dernières étant essentielles 
à sa réussite. Néanmoins, selon l’argument principal, aucun ré-
gime uniforme de responsabilités européanisées n’a vu le jour 
sur la base de ces expériences de coopération. Il s’agit plutôt 
d’un collage non uniforme des différentes façons de réguler les 
dons d’organes et les transplantations. Par conséquent, l’article 
dresse un aperçu et une typologie des modes de coopération 
actuellement établis et examine, sur la base d’études empi-
riques extensives menées dans plus de 30 états européens, les 
obstacles pouvant empêcher la poursuite d’une harmonisation 
dans ce domaine.
Don d’organes; transplantation; transnational; réglementation; 
Union européenne; échelle; échange d’organes
